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Money market structures shape monetary policy design, but the way central 
banks perform their operations also has an impact on the evolution of money 
markets. This is important, because microeconomic differences in the way 
the same macroeconomic policy is implemented may be non-neutral. In this 
paper, we take a panel approach in order to investigate both directions of 
causality. Thanks to three newly-collected datasets covering ten countries 
over two centuries, we ask (1) where, (2) how, and (3) with what results 
interaction between money markets and central banks has taken place. Our 
findings allow establishing a periodization singling out phases of 
convergence and divergence. They also suggest that exogenous factors – by 
changing both money market structures and monetary policy targets – may 
impact coevolution from both directions. This makes sensible theoretical 
treatment of the interaction between central bank policy and market 
structures a particularly complex endeavor. 
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“That in their activities and operations, the Federal Reserve 
banks influence and are influenced by developments in the 
money market is but the statement of a truism. Central banks 
must adapt their policies to the particular credit economy in 
which they operate, and these policies, in turn, influence and 
shape money market trends” (Beckhart 1932, p.3). 
1. Motivation 
Before 2008, central banks in developed countries not only pursued a similar macroeconomic 
policy – viz., slightly different versions of inflation targeting. They also implemented this policy in a 
broadly similar way and by relying on one main instrument: a short-term uncollateralized interbank 
market rate, which was kept close to the target value by liquidity-providing or liquidity-absorbing repo 
operations. These operations – often labelled open market operations – were done against safe assets, 
most often government debt, and on the central bank’s own initiative. The standing facility or discount 
window, available at the discretion of commercial banks, was more or less stigmatized and reserved 
for use in cases of emergency. 
But implementation frameworks also differed in some important respects. This became 
suddenly evident when the financial crisis hit in 2007/2008. Beforehand, the Federal Reserve had 
operated exclusively with a handful of dealers in the market for Treasury debt, while the European 
Central Bank traditionally auctioned liquidity to hundreds of large and small universal banks and 
against a much broader set of collateral. Few people cared about these differences as long as financial 
markets redistributed central bank liquidity smoothly within the banking system. When the wholesale 
market froze, however, the Fed had to introduce a number of new lending programs, while (at least in 
the initial phase of the crisis) the E.C.B. managed to cope with the shock without changing its existing 
framework. Since then, changes in market functioning and new regulation (in particular, liquidity 
requirements under Basel III) have raised concerns that in the medium term, the pre-crisis operational 
frameworks might no longer work as before and would thus need to be adjusted. 
This suggests that the microeconomic aspects of monetary policymaking – which 
macroeconomics and economic policy have long neglected as a merely technical issue – are worth 
much more attention than they are usually paid. If implementation frameworks differ significantly 
across countries today, a look back in time uncovers even more important dissimilarities. This raises 
the question of understanding why implementation frameworks actually look the way they do. 
Unfortunately, not much is known about the characteristics of such frameworks in different 
geographical and chronological contexts. Clearly there is some interaction between the structure of 
money markets and the practice of monetary policy, but the question has been hardly investigated in a 
comprehensive manner so far. In order to address it, this paper takes a panel approach. The idea is to 
systematize our dispersed knowledge on the evolution of money markets and monetary policymaking, 
to identify regularities, and to propose hypotheses about the relation between the two. 
To our knowledge, this research is innovative in at least two respects. On the one hand, we 
are the first ones to perform a comparative analysis (based on several newly-collected datasets) of the 
microeconomic aspects of monetary policymaking for a relatively large number of countries over a 
period of nearly two centuries. As our survey starts with the early 19th century, we are able to cover 
the entire history of still existing central banks for all of the countries included in our sample except 
for the Bank of England, which has a longer history still. On the other hand, we are the first ones to 
explicitly organize information in a framework of coevolution. Our idea is that there are mutually 
enforcing processes in the way money markets and monetary policymaking evolve over time: the way 
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the former work not only shapes, but is also shaped by the way the latter work. In our survey of 
historical evidence, we systematically collect information on both directions of causality. 
Our work is at the crossroad of two independent strands of the economic and financial 
literature. On the one hand, there is the literature on the workings of money markets: it features a 
wealth of case studies focusing on specific markets in some given periods, but no panel analysis 
actually exists. On the other hand, there is the literature on monetary policy implementation: it features 
a number of interesting comparative analyses, but they either provide an only loosely connected 
collection of individual country portraits (e.g. Holbik 1973; Bank for International Settlements 1997), 
cover a short period of time (e.g. Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh 1989; Borio 1997) or a very limited 
number of countries (e.g. Goodhart et al. 1994; Bindseil 2004). As far as we know, works attempting 
to bring these two dimensions together are exceedingly scarce – one exception being Forssbæck and 
Oxelheim (2007), who cover a number of small European countries from 1980 to 2000. Our paper 
breaks new ground not only because it provides a panel analysis of a larger number of developed 
countries over a very long period, but also because it links these two strands of the literature in a 
systematic way throughout the analysis. 
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches a conceptual framework for 
approaching the question of the coevolution of money markets and monetary policy design. Section 3 
constructs quantitative indicators to capture long-term trends and patterns, and presents three newly-
collected historical datasets. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The Coevolution of Money Markets and Monetary Policy: A Conceptual Framework 
Coevolution is defined as the influence of closely associated objects on each other in their 
evolution: changes in A will trigger changes in B, which in turn will trigger changes in A – and so on 
and so forth, in a continuous loop. The medium- to long-run evolution of money market structures and 
monetary policy design is a clear case of such reciprocal influence. In what follows, we focus on the 
channels through which causality works in both directions. First, we ask how the way money markets 
are structured may impact the design of monetary policymaking. Then, we ask how the way monetary 
policy is designed may impact the structure of money markets. Finally, we present our approach with 
respect to this question. 
2.1 From Money Markets to Central Banks 
A central bank is generally defined as a banking institution whose liabilities (banknotes and 
deposits) play the role of ultimate medium of exchange (high-powered money) in a given geographical 
area. This privileged situation is granted to the central bank by its sitting at the center of the payments 
system. Such a privilege typically does not come without strings attached, as a central bank is often 
required to be the ultimate banker to the government. In view of this, a central bank’s final objectives 
may be manifold. They may include: preventing disruptions in the payments system (by keeping an 
efficient financial infrastructure or implementing lending of last resort), protecting the real value of its 
liabilities (by maintaining convertibility, a foreign exchange target, or price stability), supporting 
government finance (by lending directly to the Treasury or keeping orderly conditions in the 
government debt market), supporting some particular institutions or sectors considered as strategically 
important (by providing subsidized loans or preferential credit conditions), and ensuring profitability 
to shareholders (by farming seigniorage and other operating revenues) – which historically often 
meant running a commercial banking business. 
In order to pursue these aims, a central bank typically interacts with the rest of the financial 
system through the interface of money markets. A money market is generally defined as the locus in 
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which credit assets of short maturity (e.g. up to one year) are exchanged. Because of the particularly 
short average maturity of a central bank’s liabilities, money markets tend to be its preferred domain of 
operation. Yet many different money markets often coexist, and the central bank will not necessarily 
be active in all of them. The choice to participate or not in a particular market may depend on different 
orders of factors. First, it may be dictated by the nature of the central bank’s final objectives (e.g. 
entering the government debt market if political requirements imply so, or the foreign exchange 
market if a foreign exchange target is set). Second, it may be influenced by the fundamental properties 
of the underlying asset – viz., its ex ante liquidity (the existence of a sufficiently strong supply and 
demand) and inherent credit risk (the characteristics of debtors, the opportunity to create supervisory 
structures, the easiness to seize collateral). Third (and most important), it will be urged by the actual 
possibility for the central bank to produce significant and durable effects on the financial system – 
viz., the bank’s capacity to effectively influence market prices and the market’s ability to transmit 
impulses to the wider system and thus serve the bank so as to achieve its ultimate objectives. 
Once the central bank has selected the money markets in which it will participate, it can 
proceed to organize its operations. The design of monetary operations depends on market 
characteristics at a twofold level. On the one hand, the bank may take either a passive or an active 
stance: it may leave initiative to provide (or withdraw) liquidity to its counterparties (as is the case 
with standing facilities) or, alternatively, take initiative on its own (as is the case with open market 
operations). On the other hand, according to the identity and features of market participants, the bank 
will decide on the counterparties it wants to interact with. This selection may be relatively neutral 
(including all or most market participants) or alternatively non-neutral (possibly creating privileged 
positions for a small group of counterparties, selected according to some particular criteria). The way 
monetary policy is designed will, in turn, have an impact on the market characteristics on the basis of 
which it had been formulated. 
2.2 From Central Banks to Money Markets 
Once a central bank has chosen to enter a given money market, the latter will no longer look 
the same. Because of the monetary authority’s involvement, in fact, crucial changes are bound to take 
place in the microstructure of the market and, consequently, in the behavior of prices. 
In view of its size and its faculty to create high-powered money out of nothing (albeit subject 
to some constraints), the central bank is not an actor in the money market as any other. In fact, the 
central bank’s participation in a market inevitably enhances the liquidity of the market ex post – not 
only because it establishes a direct channel through which financial assets can be converted into cash, 
but also because it might encourage further participation via network effects. Moreover, a central bank 
often has the firepower to become the market-maker of the money markets it participates in – thus 
modifying their microstructure very radically. The presence of a market-maker impeding complete 
dry-ups of demand (i.e. a lender of last resort) may provide a money market with a competitive 
advantage with respect to others; such “subsidization” can be so extreme as to allow for the creation of 
previously inexistent markets. Thanks to its power, a central bank may be able to impose 
modifications on the characteristics of market participants (e.g. by refusing to operate with some kinds 
of counterparties) as well as on the characteristics of the exchanged assets (e.g. by requiring 
standardization or quality enhancement). 
By construction, changes in the microstructure of money markets have a direct impact on 
price behavior. The market-maker’s willingness to buy unlimited amounts at a given bid price (i.e. the 
existence of a purchase or lending facility) sets a ceiling to market prices, while its willingness to sell 
unlimited amounts at a given ask price (i.e. the existence of a selling facility) sets a floor. Prices can 
also be impacted indirectly by a central bank’s spot and forward buying and selling operations, and – 
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even in the absence of transactions – by the simple creation of expectations. All of this will decrease 
the volatility of prices, thus potentially reducing the amount of market risk associated with the given 
monetary asset. 
The relationship between central bank intervention and market success is far from being 
univocal, though. The complexity of this relationship emerges when money markets with an active 
central bank are compared to markets without. On the one hand, it is possible that non-participated 
markets suffer from a relative decline in liquidity and popularity in front of participated ones because 
of the above-mentioned reasons. This might imply, however, that a central bank’ involvement in a 
market may get so heavy, that when policy objectives change and the central bank wants to disengage, 
the commercial market structure left behind is inadequate and there is a risk of a sudden loss of 
liquidity. On the other hand, however, the central bank’s market power over participated markets may 
open scope for some sort of “regulatory” arbitrage: in fact, it is also possible that non-participated 
markets become an ideal outlet for those unable or unwilling to abide with the central bank’s 
requirements, as well as for those looking at price volatility as a positive thing (i.e., generating profit 
opportunities). As a result, central banks’ endeavor to impact money market structure may backfire, as 
it may not necessarily increase the efficacy of monetary policy itself. 
2.3 Conceptual Issues: Sum-Up 
The evolution of money markets and that of monetary policymaking are determined by both 
exogenous and endogenous factors. Money markets may evolve because of changes originating 
outside the financial system (e.g. increasing or decreasing demand or supply of a given asset as 
industrial or commercial practices develop). Some of these changes might be country-specific while 
others international. But money markets may also evolve because of modifications in the operational 
and regulatory policies adopted by central banks. In turn, monetary policymaking may evolve because 
of changes originating outside the financial system (e.g. increasing or decreasing importance attached 
to certain asset classes as political conditions develop), but also because of modifications in the 
characteristics of money markets. Assessing precisely the relative weight of exogenous and 
endogenous factors in triggering evolutionary trends is still an impossible task given the current state 
of our knowledge. In the light of this, we opt for a descriptive rather than an explanatory approach as a 
first step into this largely under-researched subject. In what follows, we try to mobilize as much as 
possible historical information. With the aim of identifying from hard data broad trends and empirical 
regularities, section 3 mainly presents quantitative evidence, complemented by qualitative information 
available from different types of sources. Our goal is to provide an as much as possible inclusive 
review of the coevolutionary trends that have emerged over the last two hundred years. 
3. Quantitative Evidence 
To develop a sense of how much the interaction between money markets and monetary 
policymaking has changed over time and to identify relevant criteria and indicators, it is convenient to 
start from an obvious but telling example: a basic comparison of the monetary practices of the world’s 
most important central bank today (viz. the Federal Reserve) with those of the world’s most important 
central bank around one hundred years before (viz. the Bank of England). 
Before 2008, the Federal Reserve could be sketchily (albeit, under some respects, rather 
imperfectly) described as a central bank mainly operating (a) in the government bond market (b) by 
implementing repos (c) on its own initiative (d) with a relatively small number of counterparties (e) 
while offering a more or less stigmatized standing facility exclusively as an emergency tool, and this 
(f) with the aim of targeting the uncollateralized interbank market interest rate (g) in order for the latter 
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to basically coincide with the main policy rate – i.e., (h) much lower than the standing facility rate. 
One century ago, instead, the Bank of England could have been sketchily (but again, quite 
imperfectly) described as a central bank mainly operating (a) in the acceptance market (b) by 
discounting assets (c) on the initiative of counterparties, through a standing facility (d) potentially 
open to a very large number of counterparties (including non-banks) and (e) not stigmatized, (f) with 
the aim of targeting the acceptance market interest rate (g) in order for the latter to fluctuate freely (h) 
below or close to the standing facility rate. 
This rough “bird’s eye” comparison suggests that the design of monetary policy 
implementation frameworks has been subjected to major changes over the decades. It also allows 
singling out three main dimensions along which interaction between money markets and central banks 
can be described: (1) The location of the interaction, i.e. what is the money market in which the 
central bank mainly intervene (government debt market vs. acceptance market) (a; f); (2) The form of 
the interaction, i.e. what is the type of financial operation the central bank mainly adopts for 
intervention (collateralized vs. uncollateralized, repos vs. discounts) (a; b); and (3) The substance of 
the interaction, which has several aspects – what are the counterparties to the central bank (d), who 
takes the initiative in monetary policy operations (c), what are the limits to operations (quantitative 
restrictions or stigma) (e) – which altogether determine the relative position of official bank rates and 
market rates (g; h). The three dimensions concern both directions of causation in coevolutionary 
patterns: what they all tell about is always the “reduced-form” outcome of the interaction between 
central bank preferences and choices, market structures and functioning, and fundamental factors 
affecting both. This does not in itself allow deducing the underlying supply and demand factors. Still, 
combined with assumptions and additional information on exogenous factors impacting market 
development and central bank preferences, it permits getting an idea on causation within the 
coevolution framework. 
All three dimensions lend themselves to quantitative characterization. In order to be useful, 
quantitative indicators should not only be representative of coevolutionary trends and patterns. They 
should abstract from institutional details, yet reflect the economic logic underlying monetary 
intervention and market functioning – thus allowing for reasonable comparisons over time and space. 
Fortunately, available data allow constructing indicators abiding by these criteria: (1) Monetary 
authorities’ main domain of intervention can be assessed by looking at the relative share of each 
money market instrument within their holdings – i.e., through an analysis of the composition of the 
asset side of central banks’ balance sheets (a stock variable); (2) The forms of the relationship between 
markets and banks can be assessed by looking at the type of instruments most often used by the central 
bank – i.e., through an analysis of the turnover in central banks’ operations (a flow variable); (3) The 
most substantial aspect of the relationship between markets and banks is price formation, which can be 
captured by comparing interest rates in the private market with official central bank rates – i.e., though 
an analysis of the spreads between interbank rates and standing facility rates (a price variable). In the 
end, the three indicators have to be interpreted together to yield a comprehensive picture of the bank-
market relationship. 
The next three subsections will address these three questions through a panel analysis of each 
indicator across time and space. The sample includes a number of big and small countries, situated 
either at the core of international monetary system or at its periphery. Although we make an effort to 
provide a reasonably representative overview, our selection criterion is inevitably heuristic. Reflecting 
long-lasting world financial equilibria, the countries in our sample are mostly located in Western 
Europe (Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Switzerland), but we also include the United States. Besides the central banks still existing to date 
(Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Banque Nationale de Belgique, Bank of England, Banque de France, 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Banca d’Italia, De Nederlandsche Bank, Norges Bank, Schweizerische 
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Nationalbank, and the Federal Reserve), we also cover institutions that provided central banking 
functions in earlier times – such as the Second Bank of the United States, Belgium’s Société Générale, 
Germany’s Königliche Hauptbank, Preußische Bank, Reichsbank, and Bank deutscher Länder, and 
Italy’s Banca di Genova and Banca Nazionale nel Regno d’Italia. 
3.1 The Location of Interaction: The Central Bank Balance Sheet 
The balance sheet of the central bank reflects all its transactions and operations: the issuance 
of banknotes, purchase and sale of precious metals and foreign exchange, investments, as well as 
monetary policy operations proper. The composition of the central bank’s assets is determined by its 
ultimate and intermediate objectives that can include stable exchange rates or the convertibility of its 
liabilities into some foreign asset, a particular level of short-term interest rates, the quantity of some 
central bank liability or wider monetary aggregates, support to the government, profitability (notably 
in the case of privately owned central banks), or the support to some selected sectors or institutions. 
The central bank will choose its investment assets and the type of operations in order to achieve its 
objectives. Key characteristics of the assets are risk, maturity, and liquidity; key characteristics of the 
markets and operations are the possibility to influence or set prices, as well as the importance of the 
selected asset/market for the broader financial and economic structure – so that policy impulses are 
transmitted predictably to other asset prices and the real economy in accordance with the objectives of 
the central bank. 
The use of balance sheet data for assessing central bankers’ main domain of intervention does 
come with a number of caveats. Definitions are not uniform, as they reflect different realities: central 
bank balance sheets have always been drawn up in the absence of international standards and with 
accounting rules that vary substantially between countries and over time (Käppeli 1930; Bindseil 
2004). Moreover, a high share of a particular instrument in the central bank’s portfolio might not 
necessarily imply that this instrument is particularly important in money market management, but 
reflect other considerations such as the earning of returns, the subsidization of particular agents, or the 
transfer of resources to the government. A further complication is due to the fact that central bank 
reports typically distinguish according to operations, not underlying instruments – i.e. advances are not 
necessarily on securities but can be granted on the security of commercial bills, while discounts can 
apply to treasury bills and thus be completely unrelated to commercial bills based on private economic 
transactions. These constraints should be kept in mind when interpreting the following evidence. 
Despite these caveats, it is nonetheless fair to say that balance sheet data provide an illustrative 
representation of the broad lines along which interaction between money markets and central banks 
takes place. 
An eternal concern for central banks is the liquidity of their investments. While such a 
concern might seem odd for the sole institution that can create liquidity at its will, the reasons relate to 
the way it has to pursue its monetary policy objectives. As long as central banks aimed to ensure the 
convertibility of their liquid liabilities (banknotes and deposits) into foreign assets (gold, silver, or 
foreign exchange) on demand, the bank’s portfolio had to be sufficiently liquid to allow a quick 
reduction of the amount of outstanding liabilities to prevent the exhaustion of reserves of bullion or 
foreign exchange reserves. In the case of inconvertible fiat currencies there is no threat of a run on 
foreign reserves, yet the central bank has to be able to adjust the level of its liabilities in order to adjust 
liquidity conditions in line with its operational target (be it a short term interest rate, an exchange rate, 
or monetary aggregates). In this setting, the asset portfolio has again to be sufficiently liquid to allow 
for a precise and timely adjustment of the liquidity position of the banking sector. 
Table 1 gives the composition of the asset side of the balance sheets of the central banks of 
the ten central banks in the sample for seven benchmark years (1835, 1880, 1909, 1928, 1950, 1970, 
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and 1990).2 The benchmark dates were selected according to three criteria: i) being representative of 
the period; ii) being as much as possible unbiased by cyclical factors (i.e., avoiding boom and bust 
periods); and iii) being compatible with data availability. Assets are grouped into the following broad 
categories: foreign assets, which can be decomposed into precious metals (gold, silver) and other 
foreign assets (bills of exchange, deposits abroad, securities denominated in foreign currencies); 
monetary policy operations as discounts, advances, and open market operations; and claims on the 
government, either as direct loans and overdrafts or holdings of government securities. In addition to 
these components, which are the most important from a monetary policy point of view, balance sheets 
also include other lending to the private sector (outside monetary policy operations) like mortgage 
loans, long-term lending to specific financial institutions, unspecified securities, and other assets 
including real estate, stakeholdings, etc. 
Figure 1 summarizes the changes in the composition of central bank assets. The following 
trends emerge. In the 1830s, foreign assets consist exclusively of bullion. From a long perspective, all 
countries report in these years relatively low shares of reserves in total assets. As money market 
integration improves in the following decades, the share of foreign assets increases everywhere. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, foreign bills start to appear in all balance sheets except those of the 
Bank of England. While holdings are small in absolute terms, they represent an element that is more 
and more actively used for active exchange rate policy in Austria (Jobst 2009), Belgium (Ugolini 
2012), France (Flandreau and Gallice 2005), and Germany (Bopp 1953). This reflects internationally 
integrated money markets that require central banks to manage the impact of short-term capital flows 
on domestic liquidity. In this context, foreign exchange markets are more liquid and have lower 
transaction costs than operations in precious metals. In the interwar years the share of foreign 
exchange increased further to the detriment of gold as foreign exchange serves more and more as 
reserve asset in addition to its role as intervention instrument (Eichengreen and Flandreau 2009): the 
only two exceptions are the anchors of the gold-exchange standard, the Fed and the Bank of England, 
which hold reserves in gold rather than foreign exchange. Following the break-down of the interwar 
gold standards, in some countries (e.g. Britain and the United States) gold and foreign exchange 
reserves were transferred to the Treasury and no longer show up in the central bank’s balance sheet. 
For the majority of countries, total foreign reserves remain relatively high until the 1970s, when an 
increasing divergence becomes visible. Some of the divergence is due to different accounting practices 
(historical costs vs. market value) that began to matter with the end of Bretton Woods, yet today 
reserve holdings appear to be much more a function of country size and exchange rate regime, and 
thus of the need for regular operations in the foreign exchange market (Borio et al. 2008). 
Domestic monetary operations (as opposed to operations in foreign assets) were long 
dominated by discounts and advances. In discount operations the central bank buys a financial claim 
with a short initial or remaining maturity at a discount to its nominal value (the discount rate). In most 
cases these claims were bills of exchange, sometimes also treasury bills. In advance or lombard 
operations the central bank grants a loan against some pledged collateral, which are typically 
securities, sometimes precious metal or goods. The principal difference between the two operations is 
that discounting is unsecured, i.e. the central bank depends solely on the ability of the issuer to pay, 
while advances are secured, i.e. in addition to the borrower’s ability to pay the central bank also 
disposes of a pledge that can be sold if the counterparty fails to do so (see section 3.2). In the first half 
of the 19th century advances can rival with discounts, but rapidly lose importance afterwards. 
                                                     
2
 In principle, the central bank can manage liquidity conditions also through the liability side of its balance sheet, 
e.g. through liquidity absorbing repo operations. This is in fact the case in a number of countries with a structural 
liquidity surplus often due to strong foreign exchange inflows that are sterilized. The phenomenon is however 
very recent and does not warrant the collection and harmonization of the liabilities for the period under 
consideration here. 
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Advances gain again in importance before World War One and during the Interwar years. After World 
War Two patterns appear more idiosyncratic. Open market operations, which in the graph are included 
alongside advances, only start to appear in the 1920s, the exception being the Bank of England that 
operated in exchequer bills and East India Company securities to adjust overall liquidity conditions as 
early as the 1830s (Wood 1939) and then in the 1890s to absorb liquidity (Sayers 1936). The 
classification here follows official statements given by central banks. In practice, the distinction 
between advances, open market operations and security holdings becomes blurry after the 1950s and 
would require a closer reading of national documentation: in the case of the Fed and the Bank of 
England, for instance, open market operations appear under the heading “lending to the government” 
as well as under “other securities”. What appears already, however, is that the extensive use of open 
market operations depended very much on the size and liquidity of underlying markets and thus only 
appears when financial markets are liberalized and earlier in larger countries, while smaller countries 
stick longer with traditional discount and/or advance operations (Borio 1997; Kneeshaw and Van den 
Bergh 1989). 
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Figure 1: Composition of central bank assets (selected dates), in % of total assets 
 
Source: Authors’ database. For the countries included at the various dates, see table 1. 
Note: Each central bank is one observation. For individual country data see table 1. Boxes cover observations 
between the first and third quartile (inside line being the median), whiskers cover the remaining observations 
except outside values. Outside values (smaller/larger than the first/third quartile less/plus 1.5 times the 
interquartile range) are plotted individually. 
 
Claims on the government appear mainly driven by geopolitical factors. Central banks came 
out of Napoleonic Wars with significant holdings of government debt, which were very slowly 
reduced over the whole 19th century. Remarkably, no major impact of World War One is visible in 
1928 (except for Britain), as very large holdings accumulated during the conflict had already been 
inflated away by then (especially in Austria and Germany). By contrast, the impact of World War Two 


























































































1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990
11 
debt portfolios are those holding relatively few foreign assets (Federal Reserve, Bank of England). It 
should be noted that this category covers a wide range of operations with very different implications 
for money markets and monetary policy. On the one hand, central banks have often been obliged to 
hold government debt as compensation for the note-issuing privilege. Typically these loans were 
remunerated below market interest rate in order to transfer seigniorage revenue to the Treasury before 
the introduction of explicit profit sharing arrangements. This was the case e.g. in Austria, Britain, and 
France. As these loans were long-term, they did not imply any particular involvement of the central 
bank in government debt markets. On the other hand, though, government debt has also typically 
served as collateral or investment asset in monetary policy operations. In this case, the main focus is 
on changing liquidity conditions in the money market, not on influencing the interest expenses of the 
government in particular. As a result, large holdings after wars might reflect not only past 
monetization of government deficits, but also the increased breadth and liquidity of the government 
debt market. Additionally, holdings of government debt can also serve to satisfy the structural demand 
for banknotes and central bank deposits. Purchases of long-term government debt have the advantage 
to be low-risk and avoid the costs of lending operations (which have to be frequently renewed). For 
instance, before 2007 the Federal Reserve provided about two-thirds of required liquidity against long-
term Treasury bonds. In the Euro area much of the structural liquidity demand is catered for through 
the investment portfolios of the national central banks, again reducing the need for regular liquidity-
providing repos. The same is probably true of the securities held by the Bank of England for most of 
its history (Wood 1939). A positive impact on government finance will however result indirectly from 
the ensuing increased liquidity of government debt. Before 2008, central banks typically tried to 
isolate these structural operations from monetary policy, and calibrated purchases so that they did not 
change asset prices or the yield curve (Board of Governors 2005). Lastly, central banks can operate in 
the government debt market to influence interest rates more broadly. This is the logic behind the Fed’s 
post-2009 Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs, that aimed for a general reduction of longer-
term market rates rather the interest rate on government debt alone (Borio and Disyatat 2010). Other 
items are most of the time small and patterns not systematic. 
To sum up, our analysis of balance sheet data allows singling out a number of trends in the 
evolution of the channels through which interaction between money markets and central banks takes 
place. (i) Foreign exchange markets initially played a relatively small role everywhere, but their 
importance increased substantially as long as international market integration developed – country size 
being a fundamental determinant of central bank involvement into this market. As far as domestic 
markets are concerned, (ii) government debt markets played a varying role across time and space 
which was mainly driven by the impact of geopolitical factors on market size, while private debt 
markets experienced a secular decline: (iii) the discount market peaked in the second half of the 19th 
century and then contracted throughout all of the 20th century to almost disappear, while (iv) the 
collateralized loan market contracted during the 19th century, partially revived in the first half of the 
20th century, almost disappeared after World War Two, and made some comeback in recent decades 
only. Interestingly, the central banks of large countries appear to have resorted to domestic 
collateralized lending earlier and more often than those of smaller ones, while the opposite is true for 
foreign reserves – probably reflecting an international specialization of money markets. 
3.2 The Form of Interaction: Uncollateralized vs. Collateralized Lending 
Section 3.1 has brought to light a changing importance of uncollateralized vs. collateralized 
lending by monetary authorities. The two techniques of intervention can be associated to two different 
concepts of liquidity, corresponding respectively to today’s definitions of liability-side (funding) 
liquidity, i.e. the ease with which funding can be obtained, and asset-side (market) liquidity, i.e. the 
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ease with which a given asset can be sold (Holmström and Tirole 2010). In some scholars’ view, these 
two conceptions of liquidity are but the two sides of the same coin (see e.g. Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen 2009): but this applies only if liability-side liquidity can be exclusively obtained through 
collateralized loans, access to which is proportional to capital. This is not necessarily always the case, 
though: when uncollateralized transactions are easily available, funding and market liquidity are not 
bound to behave accordingly. The reason is that the role of capital as a transmission channel between 
the two (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009) may not be at work: as a matter of fact, access to 
uncollateralized operations may not be proportional to capital but involve other kinds of (moral) 
guarantee (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). This suggests that the two concepts do not perfectly coincide, 
and that the fact that central banks chiefly provide the one or the other type of liquidity may have 
important consequences on the overall behavior of the financial system. 
The extent to which central bankers embark into the one or the other technique of intervention 
may be related to the credit risk associated with the two types of operations. In principle, thanks to the 
double guarantee provided by the borrower and by the collateral, secured transactions should be less 
risky – in particular if the collateral consists of easily marketable government securities and haircuts 
are significant. Unsecured lending through the purchase of commercial bills, however, also benefits 
from the additional safety feature provided by the joint moral guarantee of all persons (at least two) 
who have signed the bill. Unlike marketable securities, moreover, bills are subject to credit risk but not 
to market risk, as their price at maturity is not liable to vary. As a result, none of the two types of 
operations is necessarily superior to the other as far as risk is concerned. 
In addition, resort to the one or the other form of intervention may be dictated to central 
bankers by market characteristics. As stated above (sections 2.1 and 3.1), central banks have to keep 
liquid assets, and ex-ante liquidity is a determinant of the choice of the money market in which they 
intervene. Yet each money market only features one possible operation: by definition, only 
uncollateralized lending is possible on the discount market, while only collateralized lending is 
possible on the repo market. As a result, the forms assumed by the market-bank interaction may 
depend on preexisting structural factors. 
Lastly, and most importantly, the choice of the technique of intervention will depend on the 
preferences of central banks. The latter appear to have changed considerably over time according to 
evolving institutional environments. Commentators unanimously report that discounting of 
uncollateralized (but jointly-guaranteed) bills of exchange was clearly preferred in the 19th century. 
Reasons seem manifold. First, discounting was deemed to provide more flexibility for the adjustment 
of overall liquidity. For instance, Niebuhr (1854) argues that bills of exchange were always paid on 
time, while advances on securities and goods were most difficult to diminish in critical times as 
borrowers faced declining prices of their collateral assets. In a variation of this argument, Wagner 
(1873) maintains that continuous backflows from bills falling due could facilitate the granting of new 
loans to new counterparties, which was useful whenever money markets were not working perfectly. 
Mecenseffý (1896) and Reichsbank (1910) similarly argue that the central bank might have been 
forced to prolong advances or face difficulties selling the collateral in the very moment when the 
liquidity of its portfolio becomes more important due to a crisis. Bills, on the other hand, were 
considered to be “self-liquidating”, a widespread notion in 19th century banking (Plumptre 1947). The 
same concern about liquidity can also explain the preference of many central banks for real bills over 
finance bills, as finance bills with their need to be rolled over at maturity rather resemble advances on 
securities in moments of financial stress. Second, an additional argument in favor of discounting was 
the possibility for the central bank to derive information on economic activity from the bills submitted 
to discount (Reichsbank 1910; Roulleau 1914). Central banks were in fact big players in the market. 
Because of this, they were necessarily concerned about financial stability, and the discounting of bills 
was thought to provide the possibility to manage the extent of risk taking in the economy. Advances 
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were frequently associated with the financing of stock exchange speculation through margin trading 
because the overall position of borrowers could not be observed by central bankers, while the 
origination and distribution of bills were easier to track. By encouraging or discouraging the 
presentation of certain types of bills for discounting at its discount window, central banks could 
encourage or discourage particular activities or sectors (Allen 2014). 
On balance, discounting was thus perceived as more advantageous in the 19th century, and 
many central banks actively encouraged discount operations. Policies included preferential interest 
rates and measures to increase the pool of eligible bills by opening branch offices, lowering the 
minimum nominal amount of eligible bills as well as by reducing the number of signatures required on 
a bill (most central banks changed from three to two signatures over the course of the century). 
Central bankers’ attitude seems to have changed following World War One. This prompted a 
rethinking of the concept of liquidity, which became closer to the modern one – according to which 
asset- and liability-side liquidity are but the two sides of the same coin (Plumptre 1947; Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen 2009). Consequently, most central banks started to care less about the relative weight of 
discounts vs. advances. The long-running opposition of outright purchases vs. secured lending focuses 
today not on the maturity of outright holdings (i.e., their being “self-liquidating”) but the possibility to 
sell them in the market if need be (i.e., their “shiftability”): the ex-ante liquidity of the markets for 
those assets potentially used in monetary policy operations is thus a crucial input for the design of 
open market operations today (Borio 1997). While some central banks (notably, the Fed) keep lending 
operations to a minimum and operate mostly through outright purchases, others (like the Eurosystem) 
rely much more on secured lending. Outright purchases expose the central bank fully to credit risk, 
thus severely limiting the spectrum of assets that qualify for eligibility. The main argument in favor of 
secured loans is therefore that they can be done on a much broader set of assets without requiring the 
central bank to analyze credit risk, as the prime responsibility for repayment remains with the 
counterparty and risk control measures can be limited to keeping a sufficient margin on the collateral. 
Outright purchases, on the other hand, can be more long-term. This is an advantage insofar as the 
central bank can reduce the size of operations, limiting operational costs and risks. An additional 
argument is that long-term outright purchases allow the central bank to earn a term premium. In the 
end, the relative preferences of central banks seem again related to the structure of the financial system 
they are operating in. Outright operations in a narrow range of assets require the existence of a 
sufficient amount of eligible assets, as well as of developed and integrated money markets that can 
smoothly redistribute central bank liquidity within the banking system and financial markets more 
broadly. Secured lending operations, on the other hand, give potentially more counterparts direct 
access to the central bank using a potentially broader and diverse set of assets as collateral (Bindseil 
and Papadia 2009). This might be more necessary in less well integrated financial systems or if a deep 
and sufficiently large market in potential assets for outright holdings is lacking. The different structure 
of financial markets in the United States and the euro area and the different choices in monetary policy 
implementation are thus clearly linked. 
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Figure 2: Share of advances in domestic lending 
 
Source: Authors’ database. 
Figure 3: Share of advances in domestic lending, averages per decade 
 
Source: Authors’ database. 
Note: For individual country data, see table 2. 
 
Figure 2 gives continuous series for the share of advances in total domestic lending between 
1815 and 1914. Numbers refer to average or end-of-year holdings. As unlike outright holdings of 
securities, discounts and advances were however by statutory rules short-term, with a maturity of 
typically three months or lower, the levels give an approximation of turnover and thus the importance 
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by providing averages per decade. This we do only until World War One, as data become exceedingly 
scarce for the following period. 
Unlike what was to be expected from contemporary preferences, the discounting of bills did 
not always dominate. Instead, two patterns stand out: First, with the exception of the Banque de 
France, advances dominated domestic lending in all central banks in the first decades of the 19th 
century. Discounts then increased everywhere at the expense of advances until the 1850s. For the 
second half of the 19th century two groups of countries can be distinguished. In the Netherlands and 
Britain the share of advances recovers gradually, if not to the levels seen at the beginning of the 19th 
century. In France advances increase notably after the 1880s. In Belgium, Germany, and Austria on 
the other hand advances remain stable at low levels between 10% and 20% of total lending. If the 
preference for bills was in fact constant over the 19th century, the increase in bill holdings must have 
reflected a better availability of bills towards the mid of the century. Ziegler (1993) makes this 
argument for Prussia, where the integration of the Prussian market and the growing importance of 
trade increased the availability of eligible bills. While the Königliche Hauptbank relied to a large 
extent on holdings of long-term securities and advances, the statutes of the Preußische Bank (which 
succeeded the Königliche Hauptbank in 1847) could in a first step limit the share of advances in the 
cover of the fiduciary note issue to one sixth, and exclude them after 1856 altogether (Ziegler 1993). 
From the late 1850s onwards the share of advances in domestic lending of the Preußische Bank, later 
the Reichsbank, fluctuated between a low 10 and 20%. After 1880 the Reichsbank, concerned about 
what they considered a misuse of advances around stock-exchange settlement dates, actively 
discouraged resort to them by increasing the minimum maturity of loans, thus increasing the effective 
interest rate on very short term loans (Reichsbank 1910). A similar desire to reduce advances in the 
lending portfolio was voiced by representatives of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Mecenseffý 
1896). 
In other countries like Britain, France, and the Netherlands advances kept a more important 
role in monetary policy implementation. Bank of England directors seem to have had fewer concerns 
about liquidity, frequently fixing the rate for temporary advances below discount rate in the 1830s and 
1840s (Wood 1939). In the Netherlands the spread between the interest rate on advances and discounts 
was most of the time zero after the 1860s (De Jong 1967). The opposite was the case in France, where 
this spread apparently increased in the 1860s (Bopp 1952). The difference between Germany and 
Austria on the one hand, and notably Britain and the Netherlands on the other, might reflect 
differences in the liquidity of security markets. However, Berlin also hosted a highly developed 
market for stock exchange loans that was well integrated with the unsecured money market (Prion 
1907), thereby limiting the differences between discounts and advances from the point of view of the 
central bank. A further factor driving the differences between the resort to the discount and advance 
facilities could be preferences by the counterparties. In addition to the availability of eligible assets for 
individual counterparties (in particular non-banks probably have more bills available than securities), 
the main difference between discounts and advances from the point of view of the counterparties is the 
maturity of the loan. In the case of discounts the maturity is determined by the residual maturity of the 
bill submitted for rediscount, in the case of advances maturity can be set flexibly. This is an advantage, 
in particular in well-defined periods of temporarily high liquidity demand e.g. at the end of year or 
quarter (De Kock 1954). A higher share of advances might thus also have reflected differences in the 
structural liquidity deficit and differences in the amplitudes in liquidity demand that made 
counterparties access the central bank’s lombard facility more often and for greater sums. 
Faced with temporary needs for accommodation during World War One, central banks 
adjusted operational procedures that tended to stay in place after the war – notably the eligibility of 
Treasury bills to rediscount operations. Commercial banks adopted Treasury bills as secondary 
reserves and consequently advances against government securities and rediscounts of Treasury bills 
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became more attractive compared to the classical rediscount of bills of exchange (De Kock 1954). As 
a result, the traditional link between discounting and the bill market on the one hand, and advances 
and the market for long-term securities on the other hand, became more blurry – which actually 
complicates the interpretation of reported figures. Most central banks started to care less about the 
relative weight of discounts vs. advances. If restrictions persisted on advances in some countries 
(Germany and Austria), these can be linked to restrictions over indirect budgetary financing through 
advances on government debt rather than to the liquidity of the instrument and are thus unrelated to 
the money market. The newly created Fed applied the same rate for advances and rediscounts. The 
trend towards indifference between advances and discounts got even stronger after World War Two, 
when some central banks started to report advances and discounts lumped together – as the Bank of 
England had always done since 1844. 
The share of discounts and advances varied widely after World War Two. These differences 
appeared now due less to a preference of the central bank but rather the availability of bills in the 
different countries. Where banking systems relied more on trade bills (notably Belgium, France, and 
Germany), discounts feature more prominently in the central bank balance sheet, while their role is 
negligible in the Netherlands and Britain. As bills related to specific transactions, they lent themselves 
also easier to credit allocation. Preferential rates for discounts of certain classes of bills in Belgium, 
France, and Germany can be read in this context (C.E.E. 1962). By 1990, discounts had disappeared 
from central bank balance sheets in all countries (see above, figure 1). 
To sum up, our analysis of central banks’ lending operations allowed identifying trends in the 
evolution of the forms assumed by the bank-market interaction. Not surprisingly, patterns mostly 
coincide with developments observed through the study of central bank balance sheets (section 3.1). 
Collateralized lending was most prominent in the first half of the 19th century, when discounting was 
relatively weak and holdings of government debt important: the two phenomena were linked, as 
government bonds used to be the most common collateral for secured lending operations. 
Collateralized lending started to increase again before World War One, and became predominant 
along the 20th century. In the meantime, the nature of central banks’ collateralized loans changed, as it 
shifted from secured standing facility lending (advances) to secured open market operations (repos). 
However, significant deviations from this general trend can be recorded. For instance, unlike in all 
other countries, in France and Belgium collateralized lending played a marginal role for much of the 
19th century. Such deviations may have been the outcome of political factors (Ramon 1929; Ugolini 
2012). 
3.3 The Substance of Interaction: Market vs. Bank Interest Rates 
As seen in section 3.2, discounting and the provision of loans on collateral were the oldest 
types of monetary policy operations. Both were most often organized as a standing facility, meaning 
that eligible counterparts of the central bank could use them at their own discretion at any time, while 
the central bank fixed the general conditions for use. One of the most important parameters to be set 
by the central bank is the price of liquidity, either expressed as a discount rate (in the case of the 
purchase of short-term securities) or an interest rate (in the case of collateralized loans). For long 
periods central banks used to publicly quote a discount rate or “bank rate” that also served as the main 
indicator for the stance of monetary policy. In most countries this rate applied to the discount of 
eligible paper. Following its loss of importance in the late 20th century, some central banks (e.g. 
Deutsche Bundesbank and Schweizerische Nationalbank) abolished the discount rate in the 1990s. In 
other countries, the type of the underlying operation changed (in particular after World War Two) 
even if the old name survived: this was the case e.g. for the discount rate of the Federal Reserve, 
17 
which had since the inception of the Fed been applied to discount and collateralized lending operations 
alike, and applies exclusively to secured loans since 2002.  
A standing facility has a potentially significant impact on market interest rates. Its power 
derives from the fact that it provides an unlimited amount of liquidity at set conditions. It should be 
noted that this principal role is independent of whether the rate applies to discounting or advances. De 
facto, however, central banks set more or less restrictive conditions as to the use of the discount 
facility. These conditions concerned the definition of eligible paper, limits per counterpart, ‘moral’ 
restrictions in the sense that counterparts were advised to use the discount facility only to some limited 
extent, as well as administrative procedures that would add costs to the use of the facility. In addition, 
most central banks made clear that they could, in principle, always refuse to discount or provide 
advances without giving reasons (Bindseil 2004). The effective role of standing facilities and thus of 
the published discount or bank rate crucially depends on these rules and procedures. Changes in the 
rules repeatedly altered the relationship between official rate and market rates. A proper understanding 
of bank rate would thus require detailed knowledge about practices and how they evolved. An 
alternative approach is to look at the outcome – i.e., the observed relationship between the official 
discount rate and market interest rates as well the extent to which the facility was used in order to infer 
the rules and procedures applied. Market interest rates above the official discount rate are indicators 
for effective restrictions on the use of the facility. Evidence on the recourse gives indications as to 
whether the facility was used to satisfy structural or only occasional liquidity demand. 
In order to compare official and market rates, first a representative market rate has to be 
selected among the many rates actually employed in financial contracts. Here, the focus is on rates at 
which banks invest short-term surplus funds or borrow funds short-term. Where possible, rates should 
apply to the highest quality counterparties only, in order to avoid differences in credit risk and 
liquidity premia to pollute the results. The rates are thus most often reference rates, meaning that the 
rates actually paid might have been higher because they included an individual risk premium. Among 
different markets available to banks for short-term borrowing and lending, the most liquid market is 
selected, which is also generally considered the representative market at that time. 
In the 19th century and until the end of the interwar period, the representative market rate is 
typically a private discount rate on bills of exchange (see appendix on selections made for individual 
countries). While bills of exchange are an instrument with a long tradition (De Roover 1953), for 
many countries no quotes are available before the 1850s, which might be due either to a hesitancy of 
traders to report rates (given that usury laws made higher rates illegal) or to the structure of the market 
itself (which might have lacked standardization: Flandreau et al. 2009). When these rates appear, they 
refer to bills of highest quality, as is evident in terms like “private” or “first class” bills, which means 
that these bills if any should have been eligible for central bank discounting. Until World War One, in 
all but the most sophisticated financial markets the open market rate of discount is not only the most 
representative, but also the only short-term market rate widely published and used as benchmark in 
money market transactions. Even though the bill market declines after the War, the open market rate 
retains this role in most countries during the interwar. After World War Two, the open market 
discount rate disappears everywhere. The new benchmark is either the Treasury bill rate, which is used 
to price also interbank transactions, or an overnight rate for interbank deposits. Following financial 
liberalization in the 1970s, most countries start to quote rates structured similarly to the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which become used as benchmark and for the pricing of derivatives. 
Figure 4 plots the official discount rates along with a representative market rate for the nine 
countries in our sample. Despite significant idiosyncrasies in the design of the standing facilities in the 
various countries, distinct periods stand out, as becomes evident when looking at average spreads 
between official and market rates (figure 5) and the number of instances when market rates rose above 
standing facility rates (figure 6). 
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Figure 4: Market (in red) and standing facility interest rates (in black) 
 
Source: Authors’ database. 
Figure 5: Spread between market and standing facility rate in %: averages per decade 
 
Source: Authors’ database. 
Note: For individual country data, see table 3. War and immediate post-war periods (1914-1919 and 1939-1945) 
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Figure 6: Share of months with average market rate above average standing facility rate, averages per 
decade 
 
Source: Authors’ database. 
Note: For individual country data, see table 4. War and immediate post-war periods (1914-1919 and 1939-1945) 
are excluded from the calculation.  
 
In the first half of the 19th century official rates moved very little and mostly lie between 
four and five percent. The key feature of this period is that in all countries market rates quote time and 
again above official rates meaning that the standing facility was closed and that the central bank did 
not always serve as liquidity provider of last resort. In other respects, country experiences vary. With 
the exception of the three years between 1844 and 1847, the Bank of England in principle aimed at a 
discount rate above market rate in order to keep the provision of liquidity at the standing facility to a 
minimum and rather adjusted the liquidity position of the market through other channels like open 
market operations in Indian debt (Wood 1939) or special advances to smooth the end of quarters (King 
1936). When demand for discounts increased significantly, however, demand was not satisfied fully. 
As the Bank did not (or could not) raise the rate it instead imposed quantity restrictions (Bignon et al. 
2012). In Austria market rates quoted above official rates for extended periods of time while at the 
same time the standing facilities were used consistently. This setting suggests that access to the 
standing facilities was limited to a select group that enjoyed preferential access below market interest 
rates. From the point of view of the central bank such policy might be optimal as a means to filter out 
less risky counterparties, as was argued for Austria (Lanier 1998). This was also the case in France 
(Bopp 1952; Bignon et al. 2012). In the Netherlands access to the discount and advances facilities was 
hampered by a combination of high costs and fussiness (Jonker 1996), which might explain why 
market rates moved above official rates occasionally until the 1850s. In Prussia, the Königliche 
Hauptbank managed its (limited) discount operations restrictively, limiting access and increasing rates 
whenever liquidity conditions were tight (Niebuhr 1854). As a result and as can be seen in figure 5, 
market interest rates (where available) tended to fluctuate around and occasionally above the official 
interest rate. 
Patterns change in the second half of the 19th century. Also thanks to the repeal of usury 
laws everywhere, official rates now moved much more frequently, and by the 1860s official rates are 
the de facto upper limit of market rates in all countries covered here, as can be seen in figure 6 from 
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and the 1860s. Apparently central banks had eased restrictions on the access to standing facilities 
sufficiently so that all peaks in demand for central bank money would effectively be accommodated at 
the standing facility rate. The standing facility rate became the upper bound to the market rate. In 
Britain the change concerned policy during crises only, as during normal periods market rates had 
already quoted below the official rate before. By 1857 Bank of England directors acknowledged that 
demand for central bank deposits was (in the short run) highly inelastic and quantitative restrictions 
thus useless at best, and would cause panic at worst. Demand should be satisfied in full, while a high 
bank rate would encourage borrowers to look for alternative sources of liquidity (Wood 1939). In the 
crises of 1857 and 1866 the Bank of England acted accordingly, and the new doctrine of the lender of 
last resort was formulated in Bagehot (1873). In France, the evolution in central bankers’ attitude 
followed the very same pattern and timing as in Britain (Bignon et al. 2012). Similar changes can be 
observed on the continent at about the same time. While the Preußische Bank had restricted access to 
refinancing during the 1847 and 1857 crisis, it acted as a reliable source of refinancing in the crises of 
1866, 1870, and 1873 (Tilly 1966; Ziegler 1993). The same is true for its successor, the Reichsbank 
(Bopp 1953; Prion 1907). Austria is a comparative late-comer. Here the market rate quoted above the 
official rate quite frequently until as late as the mid-1870s. The stock exchange crisis of 1882 marked 
the last instance of the market rate surpassing the official rate; in later years the official rate became 
the effective cap on market rates. In the Netherlands, this was true at least by the early 1870s. Before, 
the money market was apparently flexible enough to weather the crises of 1857 and 1866 without 
much support from Nederlandsche Bank (Jonker 1996). 
While the lender-of-last-resort function of the standing facility thus became general, the 
behavior of market rates below the official rate continued to differ across national markets, as is 
evident in the ten-year averages in figure 5. In some countries market rates were most of time close to 
or equal the official rate, while in other countries market rates quoted on average up to one percentage 
point below. Short-run patterns looked of course even more different. The importance of the standing 
facility rate depends on the need of the market to access the facility on a daily basis and thus on the 
aggregate liquidity position of the banking system. The aggregate liquidity position in turn depends on 
alternative sources of liquidity. These can be foreign exchange inflows (that in a fixed exchange rate 
system as the 19th century metallic standards will be automatically converted into domestic money) or 
operations on the initiative of the central bank like investments or explicit open market operations. In 
some instances high liquidity resulted from the monetization of government debt. If after taking these 
alternative liquidity sources into account the system as a whole still suffered from a shortage of 
liquidity it is forced to access the standing facility and market rate should quote at the official rate. 
Often this occurred when the demand for liquidity peaked at the end of the month, quarter or year (e.g. 
in Britain: Goodhart 1986). Conversely, a market rate below the official rate implies that there is no 
aggregate need for liquidity and thus the standing facility would not be used. In fact, however, even 
though the extent of usage differed, recourse to the standing facility was always positive at all central 
banks in this period (see sections 3.1 and 3.2). Such recourse, that could be labeled individual recourse 
as opposite to aggregate recourse, must reflect some transaction costs that prevented banks to access 
the liquidity available in the market at the lower market interest rate (Bindseil 2004). In the case of the 
Bank of England, this was due to special long-standing client relationships (Ziegler 1990). On the 
Continent, central banks entertained business relations with a wider set of clients that would often not 
qualify for the discount market, typically restricted to first class banking houses. The maintenance of 
large branch networks further increased the number of central bank counterparts that had no 
alternative access to the money market. The importance of individual recourse is well evident in the 
constantly high use of the discount facility in the face of high spreads between market and official 
rates, notably in Germany (table 3). An indication for the different motivation for accessing the 
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standing facility is provided by the typically much longer maturities of discounts at branch offices 
(source of structural liquidity) than at the main offices (cover peak demand).   
In modern parlance, the changes happening after the 1850s can be resumed as the 
establishment of a one sided interest rate corridor that in some countries was combined with additional 
liquidity providing or absorbing operations below the standing facility rate. In principle, this 
framework remained in place during the Interwar. In all countries the discount rate continued to cap 
market interest rates, even though discount operations lost in importance relative to open market 
operations. The Bank of England started to keep market rates considerably below its discount rate 
through open market operations (Sayers 1976). The same role as upper limit to market rates can be 
observed for France, Austria, and the Netherlands. The newcomer to the central bank world, the 
Federal Reserve, was an outlier. At its foundation, the Fed conceptualized discount rates as penalty 
rates along the lines of the Bank of England, but soon market rates quoted above discount rates and 
continued to do so until 1932. The U.S. discount window was from the beginning set up in a much 
more complicated fashion than discount facilities in Europe. The Fed distinguished several types of 
recourse with different access criteria and administrative procedures (Meltzer 2003). Conditions and 
rates were set autonomously by the individual Federal Reserve banks, making coordination with open 
market purchases as at the Bank of England very difficult (Meulendyke 1989; Meltzer 2003). During 
the banking crises of the 1930s, the discount window became increasingly stigmatized. Access to the 
facility was interpreted as a sign of problems at the individual bank and not of aggregate need for 
liquidity, a pattern that persisted in the U.S. at least until the early 2000s. As a result, the discount 
window was barely used despite costs below the level of market interest rates.  
After 1945, in many countries the traditional ordering of money market and official rates 
reversed and market rates started to quote above the discount rate. Data are no longer easy to interpret, 
as the number of relevant official interest rates multiplies in many countries and money markets 
became segmented. While in some countries preferential rates had been available for specific kind of 
paper (e.g. government securities in collateralized lending) or counterparties (e.g. agricultural 
cooperatives), before World War Two the frameworks were in principle oriented around one interest 
rate – or, in some cases, two (discount and advances). Now central banks started to operate with four 
or five standing facilities upwards, each with its own interest rate. The reason for this dramatic change 
of approach was the introduction of restrictions on the use of the facility within the context of 
pervasive credit controls during and after the War, and often the introduction of specific rates for 
different classes of credit. This was the case most notably in France and Belgium, whose central banks 
operated with a multitude of different rates. Credit controls played a significant role also in the case of 
Britain (Tucker 2004) as well as in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium (C.E.E. 1962). Individual 
country experiences were rather idiosyncratic. The German central bank assigned the discount facility 
a key role after 1948 and until the 1980s. However, already in the 1950s the Bank set individual 
discount limits calculated as a function of selected liabilities of the banks, thereby changing the 
discount facility to a much more administrative procedure. In the beginning, foreign exchange inflows 
limited the need for liquidity from the standing facility, so that the discount rate served as an effective 
ceiling for market rates. From the mid-1970s onwards, recourse became systematic such that the 
discount rate became the floor rather than the ceiling for market rates, as banks would typically reduce 
discount loans to zero before market rates could fall below the discount rate. The role of the marginal 
borrowing facility was taken over by the advances facility, priced above the discount rate and access 
to which was most of the time unlimited. The rates thus formed a sort of corridor for the short-term 
interest rate (Bindseil 2004). 
New consensus: corridor. The liberalization of financial markets in the 1980s and the return 
to market rather than administrative pricing reduced the variety of instruments used across countries. 
The major reforms of the money market in England in the mid-1990s (Tucker 2004), the introduction 
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of the primary credit facility in the United States in 2002 (Bindseil 2004), and the start of the 
Eurosystem in 1999 (Galvenius and Mercier 2011) marked the convergence of the major central banks 
towards a new consensus (Borio 1997). Within this consensus the role of the standing facilities, in 
most cases a borrowing and a lending facility forming a corridor, is to prevent sharp increases or 
decreases of the market rate due to unforeseen changes in liquidity demand. According to current 
practice, the borrowing facility is available against a sufficiently wide range of collateral and not 
subject to administrative procedures and so, as a successor to the old discount facility, provides again 
an upper limit to market rates. In normal situations, open market operations by the central bank should 
keep market rates close to the target rate within the corridor and thus well below the borrowing facility 
rate, however. Recourse to the facility is accordingly small and not systematic. The main difference to 
the framework exemplified by the Bank of England before 1914 is thus that nowadays (at least until 
2008) central banks effectively neutralize any liquidity shocks through open market operations and 
reserve averaging, thereby keeping market rates close to target rate, and never forcing (or even letting) 
the market “into the bank”. Yet this very refined system is not without downsides. As banks should be 
able to obtain all required liquidity at the market rate, use of the borrowing facility implies that the 
borrowing bank had for some reason no market access. This might be related to timing – if e.g. an 
unexpected large payment occurs after the interbank market has closed – but could also signal more 
fundamental liquidity troubles. Consequently, use of the borrowing facility has a tendency to become 
stigmatized – a problem most notably discussed for the case of the Fed (Armantier et al. 2011). When 
recourse to central bank borrowing is stigmatized, the standing facility rate no longer serves as the 
upper bound to market rates. If not de jure, de facto this is bound to recreate a situation similar to the 
early-19th-century one, in which the lending-of-last-resort function was not properly provided by 
central banks. As the 2008 crisis seems to suggest, such dysfunctionalities in the design of the standing 
facility may engender very costly effects on the overall financial system and require central banks to 
create new quasi standing facilities – as exemplified by the full-allotment policies of the Fed and 
E.C.B. during the crisis that might yet suffer from stigma as well. 
To sum up, thanks to our analysis of market vs. bank interest rates we are now able to draw a 
general sketch of the changes in the substance of the market-bank interaction which have taken place 
over time and space. Positive market-bank spreads frequently occurred in the first half of the 19th 
century, when central banks often rationed credit to a number of counterparties. They basically 
disappeared around the mid of the century, as soon as usury ceilings were dropped and central bank 
started to behave as neutral lenders of last resort. They forcefully reappeared after World War Two, 
when a number of preferential conditions for access to central bank liquidity started to be granted to 
different classes of counterparties. Spreads returned to drop after the 1980s, as central banks generally 
went back to a more neutral stance with respect to money market participants. Recent attempts at 
neutrality, however, may have been partly compromised by the sentiment of stigma informally 
instilled around the discount window. Together with the increasing paucity of the number of 
counterparties, the creeping stigmatization of standing facility borrowing is a major difference 
between today’s implementation framework and that prevailing in the late 19th century. 
3.4 Quantitative Evidence: Sum-Up 
The results of our quantitative survey suggest that during the last two centuries there were at 
least four major breaking points, when the interaction between money markets and central banks 
underwent some substantial transformations. (1) In the mid-19th century, the earlier importance of 
government debt and collateralized loan markets faltered, as the discount market became the 
predominant channel of interaction between central banks and their counterparts: at around this time, 
credit rationing disappeared and the official discount rate became the effective upper bound to market 
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rates. (2) World War One was a natural watershed, accelerating the rise of foreign exchange markets 
and the come-back of government debt markets. (3) World War Two exacerbated such transformations 
by making wartime credit controls durable: insulation allowed for significant divergences in country 
experiences and for the creation of a number of privileged positions in the access to central bank 
liquidity. (4) The financial liberalizations of the 1980s and 1990s finally fostered a new convergence 
of monetary practices around the world, with a general disappearance of discount markets, a relative 
decline of government debt markets, and a relative rise of foreign exchange and repo markets: like in 
the late 19th century, market rates returned to stay lower than standing facility rates, but – unlike in the 
late 19th century – stigma also came to be attached to the discount window. 
The fundamental drivers of the breaks we observed appear to have been exogenous factors: 
changes in the availability of financial assets (e.g. increasing provision of trade acceptances or 
government debt), changes in the level of international financial integration (e.g. the late-19th-century 
globalization or the early-20th-century deglobalization), as well as changes in the structural 
characteristics of the country (e.g. its position within the international monetary system or its level of 
indebtedness). Driven by these exogenous inputs, money market structures and monetary practices did 
evolve together.  
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have surveyed historical information concerning the interplay between 
money market structures and monetary policy design in Western countries over roughly two hundred 
years. We have found that the very foundations of the relationship between markets and central banks 
evolved considerably over time. The money markets that central banks participated in were not always 
the same; the operational techniques implemented by monetary authorities did vary; and the 
operational targets of monetary policy also changed. On the one hand, the characteristics of money 
markets (ex-ante liquidity, credit risk, market participation, quality of transmission channels) played a 
role in determining central bankers’ choice of their preferred fields of intervention (the acceptance 
market, the government debt market, etc.), of their preferred techniques (uncollateralized or 
collateralized operations), and of their preferred stance (neutral or not). On the other hand, though, the 
way monetary policy was designed also played a role in determining the relative importance of money 
markets (the supremacy of the acceptance market, of the government debt market, etc.), their mode of 
functioning (origination of the one or the other collateral), and their attitude towards monetary 
authorities (reliance on the lender of last resort, or not). Both directions of causation contributed to 
determining what monetary policy implementation frameworks looked like over time and space. In the 
cross-sectional dimension we have seen that, although international trends play a crucial role, 
significant differences persist between countries even in periods of convergence. This means that the 
big, important central banks, that typically dominate policy debates and academic research, are often 
outliers rather than representative for central banking practices at their time. This is in particular true 
concerning the role of foreign exchange, the relative importance of government and non-government 
domestic assets, as well as the reliance on market mechanisms vs. standing facilities in the conduct of 
monetary policy operations. 
Our survey suggests that although implementation frameworks may evolve endogenously, the 
factors leading to more drastic transformations are rather exogenous in nature. This implies that 
assessing the actual efficiency of each framework may be much more complicated than it might 
appear at first sight. Exogenous shocks on money market structures (e.g. commercial openness as a 
driver of the development of the acceptance market, or government indebtedness as a driver of the 
development of Treasury bond market) are bound to impact the degree of optimality of a given 
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monetary policy design. At the same time, though, also exogenous shocks on central bank’s 
policymaking (e.g. political pressure to keep a standing facility for acceptances, or political need to 
subsidize the government bond market) are bound to impact the degree of optimality of a given money 
market structure. Approaching these phenomena theoretically in a sensible way appears to be an 
extremely complex issue. This is even more complicated by the fact that apparently exogenous shocks 
may not be mutually exogenous. Just to give an obvious example, the economic push leading to the 
emergence of the government debt market and the political push leading to the emergence of the 
central bank’s management of this market hardly look independent of each other. In order to get a 
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Bank Dates Source 
    
Austria   
 Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1835 OeNB archives 
 Oesterreichisch-ungarische 
Bank 
1880, 1909 Annual reports, complemented by OeNB archives 
 Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1928, 1950, 1970, 
1990 
Annual reports, OeNB 
    
Belgium   
 Société Générale de Belgique 1835 Malou (1863) 
 Banque Nationale de Belgique 1880 - 1990 Annual reports, NBB 
    
Britain   
 Bank of England 1835 Parliamentary Report on Banks of Issue (1840), App. 16 
  1880  BoE archives 
  1909 Lévy (1911); BoE archives 
  1928 Käppeli (1930); BoE archives 
  1950, 1970, 1990 Annual reports, BoE; BoE archives 
    
France   
 Banque de France 1835, 1880 Annual report, BdF 
  1909 Lévy (1911) 
  1928 Käppeli (1930) 
  1950, 1970, 1990 Annual report, BdF 
    
Germany   
 Königliche Hauptbank 1835 Niebuhr (1854) 
 Reichsbank 1880  Reichsbank (1910) 
  1909 Lévy (1911) 
  1928 Kerschagl (1929) 
 Bank deutscher Länder 1950 Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975 
 Deutsche Bundesbank 1970 Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975 
  1990 50 Jahre Deutsche Mark: monetäre Statistiken 1948-1997 
    
Italy   
 Banca di Genova 1845 De Mattia (1967) 
 Banca Nazionale nel Regno 
d’Italia 
1880 De Mattia (1967) 
 Banca d’Italia 1909, 1928, 1950, 
1970, 1990 
Caron and Di Cosmo (1993) 
    
Netherlands   
 De Nederlandsche Bank 1835, 1880 De Jong (1967) 
  1909 Lévy (1911) 
  1928 Mitteilungen der OeNB 
  1950, 1970, 1990 Annual reports, DNB 
    
Norway   
 Norges Bank 1835 - 1928 Hvidsten (2013) 
  1950, 1970, 1990 Historical monetary statistics, NB 
    
Switzerland   
 Schweizerische Nationalbank 1909 - 1990 Historical time series, SNB 
    
United States   
 Second Bank of the United 
States 
1831 Catterall (1903) 
 Federal Reserve System 1928 Kerschagl (1929) 
  1950, 1970, 1990 Annual reports, Federal Reserve System 
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Uncollateralized and collateralized domestic loans 
 
Bank Period Source Type of data 
     
Austria    
 Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1818 - 1860 Lucam (1861) End of year 
  1861 - 1866 Lucam (1876) End of year 
 Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1867 - 1877 Annual reports, OeNB End of year 
 Oesterreichisch-ungarische 
Bank 
1878 - 1918 Annual reports, OeNB End of year 
 Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1919 - 1993 Annual reports, OeNB End of year 
     
Belgium    
 Banque Nationale de Belgique 1851 - 1913 Annual report 1950, NBB End of year 
  1924 - 1973 Mitteilungen der OeNB End of year 
     
Britain    
 Bank of England 1832 - 1840 Parliamentary Report on Banks of Issue (1840), App. 12 End of year 
  1841 - 1847 Parliamentary Report on Commercial Distress, 2nd Report 
(1847), App. 8 
End of year 
  1848 - 1913 BoE archives Yearly total 
     
France    
 Banque de France 1807 - 1964 Annuaire statistique de la France: résumé rétrospectif (1966) Yearly total 
     
Germany    
 Königliche Hauptbank 1817 - 1846 Niebuhr (1854) End of year 
 Preußische Bank 1847 - 1875 Poschinger (1879) Yearly average 
 Reichsbank 1876 - 1945 Reichsbank (1910), Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen in 
Zahlen 1876-1975 
End of year 
 Bank deutscher Länder 1948 - 1957 Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975 End of year 
 Deutsche Bundesbank 1958 - 1989 Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975, 
Bundesbank 
End of year 
     
Italy    
 Banca di Genova 1845 - 1849 De Mattia (1967) Yearly total 
 Banca Nazionale degli Stati 
Sardi 
1850 - 1860 De Mattia (1967) Yearly total 
 Banca Nazionale nel Regno 
d’Italia 
1861 - 1893 De Mattia (1967) Yearly total 
 Banca d’Italia 1894 - 1936 De Mattia (1967) Yearly total 
 Banca d’Italia 1937 - 1990 Caron and Di Cosmo (1993) Average of end 
of month 
     
Netherlands    
 De Nederlandsche Bank 1814 - 1913 De Jong (1967) Yearly average 
  1924 - 1932 Mitteilungen der OeNB End of year 
     
Norway    
 Norges Bank 1819 - 1913 Historical monetary statistics, NB End of year 
     
Switzerland    
 Sweizerische Nationalbank 1907 - 1997 Historical times series, SNB End of year 
     
United States    
 Federal Reserve System 1917 - 1942 Monetary and Banking Statistics (1943) End of year 




Monthly interest rates 
 
Instrument Period Source Frequency of 
underlying 
data 
     
Austria    
 OeNB discount rate 1824 - 1999 OeNB Daily 
     
 Shadow interest rate Trieste 1835 - 1859 Journal des österreichischen Lloyds, Osservatore Triestino, 
Oesterreichischer Volkswirth, Austria 
Weekly 
 3 month prime bills Vienna 1860 - 1870 Coursblatt des Gremiums der Börse-Sensale Weekly 
 3 month prime bills Vienna 1871 - 1914 Denkschrift zur Währungsfrage, after 1874 Wiener Zeitung End of month 
 3 month prime bills Vienna 1923 - 1931 Mitteilungen der OeNB Weekly 
 Taggeld 1968 - 1999 OeNB  
     
Belgium    
 NBB discount rate 1851 - 1914 Annual report 1950, NBB Weekly 
 NBB discount rate 1919 - 1998 NBB  End of month 
     
 Antwerp open market 1844 - 1861 SCOB database Weekly 
 Brussels open market 1861 - 1914 The Economist Weekly 
 Discount rates at Brussels on 
first class commercial paper 
1920 - 1936 International Abstract of Economic Statistics No indication 
in source 
 Private discount rate 1937 - 1939 Fed International Financial Statistics No indication 
in source 
 Argent au jour le jour 1945 - 1969 NBB Daily 
 Rate on banks' deposits of their 
daily cash surpluses 
1970 - 1998 Eurostat Daily 
     
Britain    
 Bank rate 1824 - 1835 Clapham (1944) End of month 
 Bank rate 1836 - 1939 NBER MacroHist Daily 
 Bank rate 1940 - 2008 BoE Daily 
     
 Open market rate of discount 1824 - 1939 NBER MacroHist Weekly 
 Prime bank bill rate 1939 - 1945 Capie and Webber (1985) End of month 
 3M T-bills allotment rate 1946 - 1974 Capie and Webber (1985) End of month 
 UK Interbank overnight - 
middle rate 
1975 - 2013 Thomson Reuters Daily 
     
France    
 Banque de France discount rate 1844 - 1852 Ugolini (2010) Weekly 
 Banque de France discount rate 1852 - 1940 NBER MacroHist (some observations corrected from The 
Economist) 
Daily 
 Banque de France discount rate 1945 - 1980 BIS End of month 
 Taux directeur sur les pensions 
de 1 à 10 jours 
1980 - 1989 BIS End of month 
 Taux directeur sur les pensions 
de 5 à 10 jours 
1989 - 1998 BdF Daily 
     
 Open market, Paris 1844 - 1861 Ugolini (2010) Weekly 
 Open market, Paris 1861 - 1863 The Economist Weekly 
 Open market, Paris 1863 - 1940 NBER MacroHist Weekly 
 Paris daily rate on private paper 1958 - 1972 Mitteilungen der OeNB   
 Rate for day-to-day loans 
against private bills 
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Germany    
 Discount rate Prussian Bank 1861 - 1875 The Economist Weekly 
 Discount rate Reichsbank 1876 - 1938 NBER MacroHist Daily 
 Discount rate Bundesbank 1948 - 1999 Bundesbank BBK01.SU0112 End of month 
     
 Open market rate Berlin 1861 - 1875 The Economist Weekly 
 Private discount rate, prime 
banker’s acceptances 
1876 - 1939 NBER MacroHist Daily 
 Tagesgeld Frankfurt 1959 - 1999 Bundesbank BBK01.SU0101 Daily 
     
Italy    
 Discount rate 1863 - 1999 BdI statistical database Daily 
     
 Market rate Genoa 1885 - 1914 The Economist Weekly 
 Minimum market rate Milan 1927 - 1935 Bollettino mensile di statistica dell’Istituto Centrale di 
Statistica del Regno d’Italia 
End of month 
 Minimum market rate Milan 1935 - 1939 League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics End of month 
 Interbank rate 1971 - 1999 International Financial Statistics (IMF), corresponds to 
"Interbank rates" in the Banca d'Italia Economic Bulletin 
Average of 
daily rates? 
     
Netherlands    
 DNB discount rate 1844 - 1861 Ugolini (2010) Weekly 
 DNB discount rate 1861 - 1913 The Economist Weekly 
 DNB discount rate 1914 - 1998 DNB Daily 
 DNB discount rate 1914 - 1998 DNB Daily 
     
 Amsterdam open market 1844 - 1861 Ugolini (2010) Weekly 
 Amsterdam open market 1861 - 1913 The Economist Weekly 
 Private discount rate 1920 - 1936 International Abstract of Economic Statistics No indication 
in source 
 Private discount rate 1937 - 1939 Fed International Financial Statistics No indication 
in source 
 3M T-bills 1958 - 1972 Mitteilung der OeNB   
 Representative rate on the 
money market for loans 
between banks 
1973 - 1981 Eurostat Daily 
 Call money guilder market 1982 - 1998 DNB Daily 
     
Norway    
 Norges Bank discount rate 1818 - 1965 Historical monetary statistics NB End of month 
 Norges Bank marginal rate 
(various instruments) 
1965 - 2014 Historical monetary statistics NB End of month 
     
 Market rate Christiania 1894 - 1914 The Economist Weekly 
 Euro Krone 3M 1959 - 1986 Historical monetary statistics NB End of month 
 NIBOR tomorrow next 1987 - 2011 NB Daily 
 NIBOR 1W 2011 - 2013 NB Daily 
     
Switzerland    
 Bank rate Geneva 1892 - 1907 The Economist Weekly 
 SNB discount rate 1907 - 1999 Historical times series SNB Daily 
 SNB lombard rate/liqudity 
shortage financing facility 
1907 - 2007 Historical times series SNB Daily 
     
 Market rate Geneva 1892 - 1914 The Economist Weekly 
 Private discount rate 1924 - 1941 Fed International Financial Statistics not given in 
source 
 Call money 1948 - 1972 Historical times series SNB Weekly 
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United States    
 Discount rate New York Fed 
(average für commercial, 
agricultural and livestock 
paper) 
1914 - 1969 NBER MacroHist Daily 
 Discount rate New York Fed 
(average on loans to member 
banks) 
1969 - 2003 Fed H.15m Daily 
 Discount rate primary credit 2003 - 2013 Fed H.15m Daily 
     
 U.S. Commercial Paper Rates, 
New York City 
1857 - 1953 NBER MacroHist Daily 





Table 1: Composition of central bank assets 
Austria 1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 18 31 54 12 1 32 16 
Other foreign assets 0 3 2 54 5 43 41 
Discounts 5 25 23 15 31 12 15 
Advances 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 
Open market operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
Other lending to private sector 0 17 10 0 0 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 69 14 2 8 63 9 0 
Securities not specified 2 5 1 0 0 3 7 
Other assets 1 2 6 11 0 1 3 
Belgium 1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 7 20 15 35 29 29 8 
Other foreign assets 0 11 14 21 12 46 62 
Discounts 6 48 53 25 11 3 4 
Advances 8 2 6 1 1 0 0 
Open market operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other lending to private sector 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 34 10 9 16 46 20 21 
Securities not specified 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other assets 35 9 4 2 2 3 5 
Britain 1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 12 31 36 31 0 0 0 
Other foreign assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Discounts 30 3 10 1 1 0 6 
Advances 15 11 6 1 0 2 3 
Open market operations 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other lending to private sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 30 38 31 60 97 91 58 
Securities not specified 4 17 16 6 2 6 26 
Other assets 4 0 2 1 0 2 7 
France 1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 29 53 70 37 10 5 29 
Other foreign assets 0 0 0 41 17 27 26 
Discounts 41 30 14 5 24 37 0 
Advances 12 5 9 3 1 0 0 
Open market operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Other lending to private sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 16 8 6 4 36 7 8 
Securities not specified 0 0 0 7 8 17 3 
Other assets 3 4 1 3 3 7 14 
Germany 1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 14 53 30 47 6 60 30 
Other foreign assets 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 
Discounts 9 32 37 38 24 20 24 
Advances 13 5 10 2 8 2 2 
Open market operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 
Other lending to private sector 11 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 34 4 2 1 55 14 4 
Securities not specified 0 1 11 2 2 1 0 
Other assets 18 5 7 9 3 3 6 
Italy 1845 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 20 16 42 22 0 19 11 
Other foreign assets 0 0 5 25 12 0 11 
Discounts 77 23 21 17 3 1 0 
Advances 2 6 6 8 7 8 2 
Open market operations 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Other lending to private sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 0 12 19 18 76 69 70 
Securities not specified 0 13 2 0 0 1 1 
Other assets 1 30 6 10 1 1 4 
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Netherlands 1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 46 65 44 57 17 55 35 
Other foreign assets 0 0 5 26 26 28 43 
Discounts 23 18 19 9 0 2 0 
Advances 30 17 21 8 1 0 14 
Open market operations 0 0 0 0 0 12 4 
Other lending to private sector 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 
Securities not specified 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Other assets 0 0 1 0 0 3 5 
Norway 1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 35 49 42 31 3 1 0 
Other foreign assets 0 0 6 9 8 46 53 
Discounts 7 30 32 26 0 0 0 
Advances 0 0 1 21 0 0 31 
Open market operations 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Other lending to private sector 56 21 2 0 0 1 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 0 0 0 0 87 39 13 
Securities not specified 0 0 11 5 1 9 0 
Other assets 1 0 5 8 1 4 2 
         
Switzerland 1835 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver - - 39 48 90 51 22 
Other foreign assets - - 14 22 4 45 70 
Discounts - - 32 18 3 2 1 
Advances - - 4 7 1 1 0 
Open market operations - - 0 0 0 0 0 
Other lending to private sector - - 0 0 0 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't - - 0 0 0 0 0 
Securities not specified - - 3 2 1 1 5 
Other assets - - 8 3 1 0 1 
United States 1831 1880 1909 1928 1950 1970 1990 
Gold, Silver 16 - - 51 46 12 4 
Other foreign assets 2 - - 0 0 0 3 
Discounts 63 - - 20 0 0 0 
Advances 0 - - 0 0 0 0 
Open market operations 0 - - 9 0 0 6 
Other lending to private sector 0 - - 0 0 0 0 
Gov't securities/ claims on gov't 10 - - 4 44 70 74 
Securities not specified 0 - - 0 0 0 0 
Other assets 9 - - 16 10 17 14 
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Table 2: Share of advances in domestic lending (advances + discounts) 
 
  
AT BE CH DE FR IT NL NO UK 
1820 74 71 6  60 91 
1830 51 51 9  60 89 64 
1840 34 43 8 11 33 84 36 
1850 43 9 30 18 25 22 66 18 
1860 38 3 14 16 26 33 52 25 
1870 21 3 15 9 13 33 41 38 
1880 15 6 17 25 4 44 32 51 
1890 16 7 18 33 5 46 20 44 
1900 13 10 10 16 40 17 47 26 68 
1910 19 12 15 11 34 23 50 19 50 
 
Note: For Norway, mortgage lending is included in domestic lending. War and immediate post-war 
periods (1914-1919) are excluded from the calculation. 
 
 
Table 3: Average spreads between market and standing facility rates in basis points 
 
  
AT BE CH DE FR IT NL NO UK US 
1830 90 -63  
1840 40 6 5 -49  
1850 117 -10 12 14 -16  
1860 5 -38 -67 -35 -12 -15  
1870 -18 -34 -96 -48 -26 -40  
1880 -54 -36 -106 -46 -84 -35 -74  
1890 -31 -71 -67 -89 -41 -161 -55 -87  
1900 -37 -54 -55 -103 -60 -100 -37 -48  
1910 -33 -81 -28 -88 -44 -77 -29 -45  
1920 -32 -66 -62 -92 -92 -19 -51 -56 45 
1930 -93 -50 -48 -57 -45 -12 -143 -115 -30 
1940 -20 -149 -2 
1950 -195 -52 -8 29 -96 37 -105 4 
1960 44 -145 -36 7 73 -97 193 -39 18 
1970 81 -129 -121 126 -55 216 -29 118 -68 65 
1980 219 -56 151 -84 53 104 18 -66 133 
1990 101   102 -79 51 106 -44 -21 44 
2000 -92 -92 -92 -92 -92 -92 -92 -160 -3 -40 
 
Note: War and immediate post-war periods (1914-1919 and 1939-1945) are excluded from the calculation. 
Countries having adopted the euro have the same value for 2000. These double observations were not considered 









AT BE CH DE FR IT NL NO UK US 
1830 100 8  
1840 74 42 44 28  
1850 91 1 65 48 13  
1860 58 5 2 12 6 20  
1870 18 2 1 2 4 8  
1880 3 0 0 1 2 0 0  
1890 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 3  
1900 2 0 0 0 3 0 2 3  
1910 7 0 22 0 0 6 0 5  
1920 24 3 0 3 0 19 3 0 95 
1930 0 3 2 1 14 16 0 0 29 
1940 0 0 48 
1950 0 5 0 63 0 88 3 33 
1960 95 1 33 52 91 7 98 8 40 
1970 70 18 18 84 28 98 43 70 11 68 
1980 100 36 100 11 63 98 71 17 95 
1990 100   100 5 75 100 31 22 95 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 40 
 
Note: War and immediate post-war periods (1914-1919 and 1939-1945) are excluded from the calculation. 
Countries having adopted the euro have the same value for 2000. These double observations were not considered 
in figure 6. 
 
 
